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Abstract
We study the problems of pricing an indivisible product to consumers who are embedded in a given
social network. The goal is to maximize the revenue of the seller. We assume impatient consumers who
buy the product as soon as the seller posts a price not greater than their valuations of the product.
The product’s value for a consumer is determined by two factors: a fixed consumer-specified intrinsic
value and a variable externality that is exerted from the consumer’s neighbors in a linear way. We
study the scenario of negative externalities, which captures many interesting situations, but is much less
understood in comparison with its positive externality counterpart. We assume complete information
about the network, consumers’ intrinsic values, and the negative externalities. The maximum revenue is
in general achieved by iterative pricing, which offers impatient consumers a sequence of prices over time.
We prove that it is NP-hard to find an optimal iterative pricing, even for unweighted tree networks
with uniform intrinsic values. Complementary to the hardness result, we design a 2-approximation
algorithm for finding iterative pricing in general weighted networks with (possibly) nonuniform intrinsic
values. We show that, as an approximation to optimal iterative pricing, single pricing works rather
well for many interesting cases, such as forests, Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks and Baraba´si-Albert networks,
although its worst-case performance can be arbitrarily bad.
Keywords: Pricing, Algorithmic Game Theory, Social Networks, Negative Externalities, Random Networks
1 Introduction
People interact with and influence each other to a degree that is beyond most of us can imagine. The
magnitude of this connection has been upgraded to a brandnew level by the proliferation of online SNS (Social
Network Services, e.g. Facebook, Twitter, Google Plus, and SinaWeibo). Numerous business opportunities
are being incubated by this upgrading. Yet, its consequences are far from being fully unfolded or understood,
leaving many fascinating questions for scientists in a variety of disciplines to answer. One incredible fact
in the SNS era is that we are now able to know the complete network of who is connected with whom.
Network marketing and pricing, with the assistance of big data, could be much more precise and flexible
than traditional counterparts, and are attracting increasing attention from both industry and academia.
In this paper, we study, from an algorithmic point of view, how a monopolist seller should price to the
consumers connected by a known social network.
Consumption is never a completely private thing. As opposed to standard economic settings, the utilities
that a consumer obtains from consuming many kinds of goods, are not determined merely by his/her private
needs and the functions and qualities of the goods, but also greatly affected by the consumptions of his/her
social network neighbors. For example, the reason that we wear clothes is not only to cover ourselves
∗Supported in part by NNSF of China under Grant No. 11222109, 71101140 and 11471326, 973 Project of China under Grant
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from cold, but usually also to make other people think that we look great and unique. This social side of
consumption is becoming more and more prominent with the unification of E-commerce and SNS. It is now
very convenient for us to share with our friends our shopping results. By clicking one more button at the
time we pay for the skirt online, all our Twitter friends know immediately the complete information of this
skirt. This effect could be much stronger and faster than face-to-face sharing. Our ladybros may think the
skirt terrific and get one too, or oppositely, they may prefer later a different style to avoid outfit clash. The
former case is typical positive externality: the incentive that a consumer buys a product increases as more
and more of his/her social network neighbors buy the product. The latter opposite scenario, the incentive
decreases when more neighbors have the product, is referred to as negative externality, which is the focus
of this paper. Positive externalities are prevalent in many aspects of the society and have been extensively
studies under various academical terms (herd behavior, Matthew effect, strategic complements, and viral
marketing, to name a few). Negative externalities, in contrast, although widely exist, are much less studied.
Pricing with negative externalities. We concentrate on the negative externality among consumers
of consuming a single kind of product, which is usually luxury or fashionable one. An important reason
that a consumer buys this product is to showoff in front of his/her friends (also referred to as invidious
consumption in literature). Naturally, a consumer buys the product if the price is not higher than his/her
(total) value of the product, which is the sum of his/her constant intrinsic value and varying external value.
We propose and study the typical network pricing model, where the external value is the (weighted) number
of people to whom the consumer can showoff (i.e. his/her social network neighbors who do not possess this
product). We study, to obtain a maximum revenue, how a monopolist seller should price such a product
with negative externality to consumers connected by a link-weighted social network, where the revenue
is the total payment the seller receives, and the nonnegative integer link weights represent the influences
between consumers. While, with the help of SNS, the knowledge of social network structures and real-time
externalities is available, consumers’ intrinsic values might be known in complete information scenarios, or
partially known in incomplete information scenarios. This paper addresses the pricing problems for revenue
maximization in complete information scenarios. Our study falls into the framework of uniform pricing,
where at any time point the same take-it-or-leave price is offered (posted) to all consumers who have not
bought the product. The seller adopts a strategy of iterative pricing – posting different prices sequentially at
discrete time points, to maximize her revenue (we assume that production costs are zero). We also assume
that the consumers are myopic (a.k.a. impatient) in the sense that they, when making purchase decisions,
do not take into account their neighbors’ future actions (which might change their external values of the
product).
Contributions. Comparing with their positive counterparts, negative externalities possess more irregu-
larity and pose more challenges for research on product diffusion, especially from the perspective of pricing.
The intuitive hardness is confirmed by the following theoretical intractability.
• By a reduction from the 3SAT problem we show that finding an optimal iterative pricing is NP-hard
even for the extremely simple case of unweighted tree network with uniform intrinsic values.
Complementary to the hardness result,
• We design a 2-approximation algorithm for iterative pricing in general weighted networks with general
intrinsic values. An exact O(n2)-time algorithm is designed for unweighted split networks with uniform
intrinsic values.
The 2-approximation algorithm is remarkable for its simplicity and versatility to handle the most general
problem regardless of network topologies, link weights or intrinsic values. We also study single pricing as an
approximation of iterative pricing, and obtain the following negative and positive results
• We prove that optimal single pricing can be arbitrarily worse (at a rate of ln lnn) than the opti-
mal iterative pricing; and on the other hand, optimal single pricing provides nice approximations to
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the optimal iterative pricing for several well-known unweighted networks with uniform intrinsic values:
(lnn)-approximation for general networks, 1.5-approximation for forest networks, (1+ǫ)-approximation
a.a.s for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks, and 2-approximation a.a.s. for Baraba´si-Albert networks (a.k.a. pref-
erential attachment networks).
This justifies the importance of the research of both iterative pricing and single pricing, whose relations in
various scenarios represent different trade-offs between revenue efficiency and algorithmic simplicity.
Related work. In the economics literature, the importance of network effects and network externalities
in business began to attract serious attention around three decades ago ([14, 19]). Under the most popular
frameworks, network effects are assumed to be global instead of local. Namely, only complete networks are
considered. Consumers may also act sequentially as in this paper, but are usually assumed to be completely
rational in the way that they are able to forecast the decisions of later ones and make their purchasing
decisions accordingly. There are quite a lot of followups, most of which are beyond the scope of this paper.
We refer the reader to [22] for a most recent development in this paradigm with relaxations of assumptions
on consumers.
In the literature of computer science, network pricing stems mainly from the study of diffusion and cas-
cading. One of the most important differences between this strand of research and that of economics is
arguably that network structures are explicitly and seriously addressed. Over the last decade, under the
framework of viral marketing, the algorithmic study of diffusing products with positive externalities is es-
pecially fruitful for influence maximization, see, e.g., [11, 20, 21]. To the best of our knowledge, Hartline et
al. [17] was the first to study the diffusion problem from a network pricing perspective. They investigated
marketing strategies for revenue maximization with positive externalities. Consumers are visited in a se-
quence (determined by the seller), and asked whether to buy or not under some price (different consumers
may receive different prices, referred to as differential pricing or discriminative pricing). They showed that
for myopic consumers, a reasonable approximation of the optimal marketing strategy can be achieved in
a simple way of influence-and-exploit. While complete information was assumed in [17], Chen et al. [12]
studied the incomplete information model with rational players and positive externalities. They provided
a polynomial time algorithm that computes all the pessimistic (and optimistic) equilibria and the optimal
single price. When discriminative pricing is allowed, they proved the NP-hardness of optimal equilibrium
computation, and gave an FPTAS for the case that consumers are already partitioned into groups such that
those within the same group must receive the same price.
Iterative pricing, with a very limited literature, was discussed by Akhlaghpour et al. [1] for positive
externalities. The authors studied two iterative pricing models in which consumers are assumed to be
myopic. In the first model, they gave an FPTAS for the optimal pricing strategy in the general case. In the
second model, they showed that the revenue maximization problem is inapproximable even in some special
case. Their second model is quite similar to ours.
Although there is also a large literature in the field of classical economics studying negative externalities
(under various terms, e.g. the Veblen effect, the snob effect, the congestion effect etc.), explicit networks are
rarely treated seriously as aforementioned. One of the classical papers in this strand is [18], where the nulclear
weapon selling problem was considered from the perspective of network effects. In the more recent computer
science literature, compared with positive externalities, network pricing problems with negative externalities
are much less investigated. Chen et al. [12] showed that when both positive and negative externalities are
allowed in their model, computing any approximate equilibrium is PPAD-hard. However, the complexity
status of the problem in the case with only negative externalities is still unknown. The only paper known
to us that deals with the network pricing problem with negative externalities is [5] by Bhattacharya et al.,
although their main focus is on equilibrium computation for given prices rather than pricing. The authors
also considered linear externalities, but a combination of single pricing, complete information and strategic
consumers. They showed that for any given price, the game that the consumers play is an exact potential
game, and provided a set of hardness results. They proved that finding the best equilibrium is NP-hard even
for trees, and gave a 2-approximation algorithm for bipartite networks. Along a different line, Alon et al.
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[2] used the term “negative externality” to mean the harm of discriminative pricing on consumers (because
discriminative pricing gives many consumers a feeling of inequality).
All the papers cited above assume that externalities are only exerted between consumers who buy the
product. In contrast, for some products or sevices, e.g., public goods, externalities are exerted from pur-
chasers to nonpurchasers. Our paper is close to [9] in the sense that both papers address strategic substitutes
(each player has less incentive to buy when more neighbors purchase), although the network externalities are
negative in our settings but positive in their settings of public goods. In the computer science, the public
goods pricing problem was also studied by Feldman et al. [15]. Their work differs from ours in two main
respects: (i) In our externality model, a consumer’s utility is subtractive over the purchases made by this
neighbors, whereas in their setting, purchases of neighbors are substitutes. (ii) Technically, they related the
pricing problem (where externalities in their model are mathematically expressed in terms of products of
neighbors actions) to a single-item auction problem, while we address the pricing problem (where external-
ities are expressed in terms of sums of neighbors actions) using iterative algorithmic approaches. As noted
by the authors [15], their results carry over to a special kind of negative externality, where the valuation of
a consumer on the product is positive if and only if the consumer is the only one among her/his neighbors
who possess the product. The aforementioned literature are all on indivisible goods. The network pricing
problems for divisible goods with quadratic utilities functions have been studied in [6, 10]. Along with [15],
a growing number of papers have been addressing the network externality problem from the perspective of
mechanism design and auction theory (e.g. [4, 13, 16]).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the mathematical formulation of our
iterative pricing model. Section 3 is devoted to general iterative pricing, including NP-hardness (Section 3.1),
2-approximation for general weighted network with general intrinsic values (Section 3.2) and optimal pricing
for unweighted split network with uniform intrinsic values (Section 3.3). Section 4 discusses the relation
between single pricing and iterative pricing. Single pricing is shown to guarantee 1.5-approximation for forests
(Section 4.1), near optimal for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks (Section 4.2), (2−ǫ)-approximation for Baraba´si-Albert
networks (Section 4.3), and approximation with ratio within [ln lnn, lnn] for general networks (Section 4.4).
Section 5 concludes the paper with remarks on future research.
2 The model
Let G = (V,E) be the given undirected network (without self-loops, and possibly associated with a nonneg-
ative integer weight function w ∈ ZV×V+ ), where V ≡ [n] is the set of n consumers, and E represents the
links between pairs of consumers. When the weight function w ∈ ZV×V+ is discussed, it is always assumed
that wij = wji for all i, j ∈ V and wij = 0 if and only if ij 6∈ E. Given any consumer i ∈ V and subset
S ⊆ V of consumers, we use wi(S) =
∑
j∈S wij to denote the sum of weights contributed to consumer i by
those in S. Clearly, only i’s neighbors can possibly contribute.
We name the model under investigation as PNC (Pricing with Negative externalities and Complete in-
formation). Let Q, which usually shrinks as the iterative pricing proceeds, denote the set of consumers who
do not possess the product. Each consumer i ∈ V has an intrinsic value ν(i) ∈ R+, and her total value of
the product equals ν(i) + wi(Q). Initially Q = V . The PNC model proceeds as follows.
• Iterative pricing. The monopolist seller announces prices p1, p2, . . . , pτ sequentially at time 1, 2, . . . , τ .
• Impatient consumers. As soon as a price is announced, a consumer in Q buys the product if and only
if her current total value is greater than or equal to the current price.
• Simultaneous moves. We assume that, for each newly announced price, all consumers in Q make their
decisions (buying or not buying) simultaneously.
Note that a consumer in Q who does not purchase at current time t under price pt may be willing to
buy at a later time t′ > t under a lower price pt′ < pt. For each t = 1, 2, . . . , τ , let B(pt) denote the set of
consumers who buy the product at price pt, (i.e., at time t, or in the t-th round). We use r(p) to denote
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the revenue derived from p = (p1, p2, . . . , pτ ), i.e., r(p) =
∑τ
t=1 pt · |B(pt)|. In case of p = (p1), we often
write r(p) as r(p1). The PNC problem is to find a pricing sequence p = (p1, p2, . . . , pτ ) such that r(p)
is maximized, where both the length τ and the entries p1, p2, . . . , pτ of the sequence are variables to be
determined.
3 General iterative pricing
In this section, we study the PNC model in the most general setting where no restriction is imposed to the
length of the pricing sequence.
3.1 NP-hardness
We prove that finding an optimal pricing sequence for the PNC model is NP-hard, even when the intrinsic
values are all zero, link weights are unit, and the network is a tree. Throughout this subsection, we assume
that the intrinsic values of all consumers are zero.
We begin with some preliminaries that will be used in the formal proofs. Let p = (p1, p2, . . . , pτ ) be a
pricing sequence. For any t ∈ [τ ] and i ∈ V , we use νt(i,p) to denote the (total) value of the product at time
t (in the t-th round) for consumer i during the selling/purchase process. Since intrinsic value ν(i) is zero
by assumption, νt(i,p) is the sum of weights from i’s neighbors who have not purchased yet in the previous
rounds.
Observation 3.1. During the selling process, the value of the product for each consumer i does not increase,
i.e. νt+1(i,p) ≤ νt(i,p) for all t = 1, 2, . . . , τ − 1.
Given a subset of nodes S ⊆ V , we use rt,S(p) to denote the revenue from these consumers until time
t, i.e., rt,S(p) =
∑t
i=1 |S ∩ B(pi)|pi. For brevity, we also write rτ,S(p) as rS(p). In particular, we have
rV (p) = r(p).
Definition 3.2. We call pricing sequence p = (p1, p2, . . . , pτ ) irredundant if for each i ∈ [τ ], there is at
least one consumer who purchases under price pi.
Every pricing sequence p is “equivalent” to a unique irredundant pricing sequence p′ which is derived
from p by removing all prices under which no consumers purchase. Clearly, the equivalent pricing sequences
bring about the same revenue r(p) = r(p′). This allows us to focus on irredundant pricing sequences.
Observation 3.3. If pricing sequence p = (p1, p2, · · · , pτ ) is irredundant, then it is decreasing, i.e. p1 > p2 >
· · · > pτ .
Assume that p = (p1, p2, . . . , pτ ) is an irredundant pricing sequence. Since by Observation 3.3 the entries
of p are all distinct, we also view p as a set {p1, p2, . . . , pτ}, and use the symbol pi ∈ p to mean that pi is an
entry of the pricing sequence p. For all 1 ≤ t ≤ τ , define Bt(p) = ∪ti=1B(pi) to be the set of consumers who
have purchased in the first t rounds. For notational convenience, we set B0(p) = B(p0) = ∅. Recall that
in the PNC model we have assumed that consumers are all impatient in the sense that they will definitely
purchase as long as the current price is lower than or equal to their current values. As p is irredundant,
B(p1), B(p2), . . . , B(pτ ) can be computed in a recursive way: B(pt) = {i ∈ V : wi(V \ Bt−1(p)) ≥ pt},
t = 1, 2, . . . , τ .
Definition 3.4. A pricing sequence p = (p1, p2, . . . , pτ ) is called normal if it is irredundant, and for any
i ∈ [τ ] and any ǫ > 0, increasing pi to pi + ǫ (other prices remain the same) changes the set of consumers
who purchase at the i-th round.
Clearly, all entries of a normal pricing sequence are integers. Given an irredundant pricing sequence
p = (p1, p2, . . . , pτ ) together with B(p1), B(p2), . . . , B(pτ ), one can easily compute a normal pricing sequence
p′ = (p′1, p
′
2, . . . , p
′
τ ), which is “equivalent” to p in the sense that B(p
′
t) = B(pt) for all t ∈ [τ ], as follows:
p′t = min{wi(V \ Bt−1(p)) : i ∈ B(pt)}, t = 1, 2, . . . , τ . It is clear that r(p
′) ≥ r(p). The following
observation enables us to concentrate on normal pricing sequences in our NP-hardness proofs.
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Observation 3.5. There is an optimal pricing sequence that is normal.
The NP-hardness for the PNC model is proved by reduction from the 3SAT problem. The input of the
3SAT problem are n boolean variables x1, x2, · · · , xn, and m clauses cj = (xj1∨xj2∨xj3), 1 ≤ j ≤ m, where
xjℓ is a literal taken from {x1, x2, · · · , xn,¬x1,¬x2, · · · ,¬xn}, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ 3. For convenience,
we write xjℓ ∈ cj . The 3SAT problem is to determine if there is a satisfactory truth assignment to the n
variables that makes all m clauses evaluate to TRUE. To avoid triviality, we assume that m ≥ 3, and for
each i ∈ [n], there exist j, j′ ∈ [m] such that xi ∈ cj and ¬xi ∈ cj
′
.
Next, we prove the NP-hardness for the weighted case with general network structures. The proof, which
highlights the high level idea in our later proof to handle the unweighted case with tree structures, turns out
to be much easier to understand.
Theorem 3.6. In the PNC model, computing an optimal pricing sequence is NP-hard, even when all the
intrinsic values are zero.
Proof. Our reduction here uses a slightly restricted version of the 3SAT problem, the 3-OCC-3SAT problem,
which is known to be NP-hard, where for each i ∈ [n], there are at most three clauses that contains either
xi or ¬xi.
For any instance I of the 3-OCC-3SAT problem, we construct an instance P of the network pricing
problem on network G = (V,E) as follows. There are a total of 5n+ 3m nodes:
• For each variable xi, there is a gadget Vi. Each pair of literals xi and ¬xi are simulated by two nodes
(with the names unchanged), respectively, and three auxiliary ones, yi1, yi2, yi3. See the left part of
Figure 1 for the links and their weights.
• For each clause cj = (xj1 ∨ xj2 ∨ xj3), there is a gadget Cj . The clause is simulated by a node cj and
two auxiliary ones, dj and ej. See the right part of Figure 1 for the links and weights among them.
• A literal node (xi or ¬xi) is linked to a clause node cj if and only if this literal appears in the clause,
and the weight of the link is 1.
• The integer parameters in the weights satisfy
a1 > 5a2 > · · · > 5
i−1ai > · · · > 5
n−1an > 5
na > 5n+1mn. (3.1)
Figure 1: Literal nodes and clause nodes are represented by larger circles, while auxiliary nodes are repre-
sented by smaller ones.
Obviously, the above construction can be done in polynomial time. Observe first that all the consumers
in the variable gadgets are incident with links of weights much larger than the total weight of links that are
incident with any clause consumer. This structure permits us to consider the variable consumers before the
clause ones. In the rest of this proof, we may abuse the notations Vi and C
j a little bit to represent both
the gadgets and the corresponding node sets, respectively.
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Due to Observation 3.5, we only consider normal pricing sequences. Given any normal pricing sequence
p = (p1, p2, . . . , pτ ), let ξ be the first time that the price is equal to or lower than 2a+ 3, i.e.,
ξ = min{t : pt ∈ p, pt ≤ 2a+ 3}.
Note that before time ξ, no consumer in the clause gadgets has purchased, i.e.,
Bξ−1(p) ∩ (∪
m
j=1C
j) = ∅.
The key idea of our proof is simple: we shall show that for each pair of nodes xi and ¬xi, we can sell the
product to one and only one of them, and this makes no difference for the revenue at all before time ξ (see
Claim 1 below). The only difference that the choice between xi and ¬xi makes is upon the clause gadget
nodes after time ξ. Our construction makes these choices really hard because they correspond to a (possible)
solution of the 3-OCC-3SAT problem.
For any i ∈ [n], we note that wv(V ) ≤ 10ai for all v ∈ Vi; thus no consumer in Vi purchases when the
price is above 10ai.
Claim 1. For all i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
(i) if p ∩ [2ai, 10ai] = {10ai, 2ai}, then rξ−1,Vi(p) = 24ai, xi /∈ Bξ−1(p) and ¬xi ∈ Bξ−1(p);
(ii) if p ∩ [2ai, 10ai] = {6ai}, then rξ−1,Vi(p) = 24ai, xi ∈ Bξ−1(p) and ¬xi /∈ Bξ−1(p);
(iii) rξ−1,Vi(p) ≤ 24ai, and the equality holds if and only if p ∩ [2ai, 10ai] ∈ {{10ai, 2ai}, {6ai}}.
Statements (i) and (ii) are easily checked. It remains to prove rξ−1,Vi(p) < 24ai if p ∩ [2ai, 10ai] /∈
{{10ai, 2ai}, {6ai}}. Note that rξ−1,Vi(p) < 24ai is trivial if p ∩ [2ai, 10ai] = ∅. Hence we may assume
that there exists a maximum price pˆ ∈ p ∩ [2ai, 10ai]. By normality of p, we know that pˆ ∈ {10ai, 6ai +
hi, 6ai, 2ai+h
′
i, 2ai}, where hi and h
′
i are total weights that xi and ¬xi get from clause gadgets, respectively.
Hence hi + h
′
i ≤ 3 (recall the definition of 3-OCC-3SAT). For the case that pˆ ≤ 2ai + h
′
i, it is obvious
that rξ−1,Vi(p) < 24ai. We are left to the analysis of the remaining three cases, which will establish
Statement (iii).
• pˆ = 10ai. It follows from p∩[2ai, 10ai] 6= {2ai, 10ai} that p∩[2ai, 10ai] = {10ai}, because the only price
in [2ai, 10ai] that is smaller than 10ai and makes p normal is 2ai. This gives rξ−1,Vi(p) = 20ai < 24ai.
• pˆ = 6ai+hi. The normality of p implies p∩[2ai, 10ai] ∈ {{6ai+hi, 2ai+h′i}, {6ai+hi, 2ai}, {6ai+hi}}
and hence rξ−1,Vi(p) ≤ 3(6ai + hi) + 4ai < 24ai.
• pˆ = 6ai. An argument similar to the previous case shows that rξ−1,Vi(p) ≤ 3× 6ai + 4ai < 24ai.
Claim 2. For each 1 ≤ j ≤ m, rCj (p) ≤ 6a+ 3, and the equality holds if and only if D
j \Bξ−1(p) 6= ∅ and
p ∩ [2a, 2a+ 3] = {2a+ 1}, where Dj = {xj1, xj2, xj3}.
It is easy to check that when Dj \Bξ−1(p) 6= ∅ and p∩[2a, 2a+3] = {2a+1}, the equality rCj (p) = 6a+3
holds. We prove rCj (p) < 6a+ 3 in the other cases. When D
j ⊆ Bξ−1(p) or p ∩ (2a, 2a+ 3] = ∅, it is easy
to see that rCj (p) is at most 2a × 3 = 6a. So we only need to discuss the case of D
j \ Bξ−1(p) 6= ∅ and
p ∩ (2a, 2a+ 3] 6= ∅.
Let pˆ ∈ p∩ (2a, 2a+3] be maximum. By normality of p, we know that pˆ ∈ {2a+1, 2a+2, 2a+3}. Since
w(dj) = w(ej) = 2a+ 1, it can be seen that rCj (p) < 6a+ 3 holds for pˆ ∈ {2a, 2a+ 2, 2a+ 3}. So Claim 2
is valid.
We are now ready to prove the close relation between the 3-OCC-3SAT instance I and the PNC in-
stance P . Let opt(P ) be the optimal objective value of P . Define
L =
n∑
i=1
24ai +m(6a+ 3).
Claim 3. opt(P ) ≤ L.
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Suppose that p is an optimal solution of P . We can assume without loss of generality that pτ > 0. Let
U = V \Bτ (p) denote the set of consumers who do not purchase during the whole selling process. Note first
from our previous discussion that rVi(p) may be greater than 24ai, although rCj (p) ≤ 6a+3 holds for every
j ∈ [m]. However, rVi(p) ≤ 24ai + 3 is always valid, because
∑
v∈Vi wv(∪
m
j=1C
j) ≤ 3 (recall the definition
of 3-OCC-3SAT and the construction of P ). Also, when Vi \ U ⊆ Bξ−1(p), we do have rVi(p) ≤ 24ai.
Therefore, if (∪ni=1Vi) \ U ⊆ Bξ−1(p), the above claim is derived immediately from Claims 1 and 2.
Suppose some v ∈ Vi \ U purchases at price pt > 0 with t ≥ ξ. If v ∈ {yi1, yi2, yi3}, or v ∈ {xi,¬xi} and
pt > 3, then it can be seen easily that rξ−1,Vi(p) ≤ 20ai, and hence (3.1) implies rVi(p) ≤ 20ai+5(2a+3) <
20ai + 2ai + 15 < 24ai. It remains to consider the case where {yi1, yi2, yi3} ⊆ Bξ−1(p), 0 < pt ≤ 3, and
v ∈ {xi,¬xi}∩Dj0 for some j0 ∈ [m] with cj0 6∈ Bt−1(p). Since cj0 does not purchase before time t, it must
be the case that p ∩ (pt, 2a+ 1] = ∅. It follows pt ≤ 3 that rCj (p) ≤ 9 for all j ∈ [m]. Hence (3.1) implies
r(p) = rV (p) ≤
∑n
i=1(24ai + 3) + 9m < L. So Claim 3 is indeed correct.
To establish the NP-hardness of the pricing problem, it suffices to prove that
opt(P ) ≥ L⇔ I is satisfiable.
(⇐) Suppose that I has a satisfactory truth assignment π with s variables assigned “TRUE” and the
remaining n− s variables assigned “FALSE”. Let pricing sequence p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn+s+1) be a solution to
P such that
• There are one or two prices for each variable gadget depending on whether the variable is assigned
“TRUE” or “FALSE” in π: if xi is assigned “TRUE” then 10ai, 2ai ∈ p, if xi is assigned “FALSE”
then 6ai ∈ p;
• There is a common price for the m clause gadgets: pn+s+1 = 2a+ 1 ∈ p.
For this p, note from (3.1) that ξ = n+ s+1. According to Claim 1, rξ−1,Vi(p) = 24ai for each i ∈ [n]. For
each clause gadget Cj , due to Claim 1(i) and (ii), we know that consumer xjℓ ∈ Bξ−1(p), 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ 3, if and
only if the corresponding literal is “FALSE” in π. Since π is a satisfactory assignment, we know that there is
at least one literal in xj1, xj2, xj3 that is assigned true. Therefore, for each j, it holds that Dj \Bξ−1(p) 6= ∅.
Combining this fact with Claim 2, we know that rξ,Cj (p) = 6a+ 3 for each clause C
j . This completes the
sufficiency part.
(⇒) Suppose now opt(P ) ≥ L. Due to Observation 3.5, there exists a normal pricing sequence p =
(p1, p2, . . . , pτ ) whose objective value r(p) is at least L. Combining with Claim 3, this can only be the case
that opt(P ) = L. By arguments in the proof of Claim 3, we know that conditions in Claims 1 and 2 must
hold. We construct a truth assignment π as follows: for each i ∈ [n], if p∩ [2ai, 10ai] = {2ai, 10ai}, we assign
“TRUE” to variable xi. Otherwise, that is p ∩ [2ai, 10ai] = {6ai}, we assign “FALSE” to xi. By Claim 2,
we know that Dj \Bξ−1(p) 6= ∅ for all j ∈ [m]. Therefore π is indeed a satisfactory truth assignment for I.
This completes the necessity part, and therefore the proof of Theorem 3.6.
A corollary of the above proof says that the length of the optimal pricing sequence of the PNC problem
can not be upper bounded by any constant. This remains true for the unweighted trees without intrinsic
values, as seen from the proof of the following stronger NP-hardness result.
Theorem 3.7. In the PNC model, computing an optimal pricing sequence is NP-hard, even when the
underlying network is an unweighted tree and all the intrinsic values are zero.
While the proof, which we postpone to the appendix, has high level similarities to the one for Theorem 3.6,
a substantially more careful approach is required to handle the acyclic structure, and new ideas are needed
to simulate the weights with unweighted links.
In view of the above NP-hardness result, it is desirable to design good approximation algorithms for the
general PNC problem and exact algorithms for special cases. In the following, we obtain 2-approximation
for the general case (Theorem 3.8), and an optimal pricing for unweighted split networks (Theorem 3.9).
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3.2 2-approximation
As to approximation, we find that, more or less surprisingly, a very simple greedy algorithm performs fairly
well, achieving 2-approximation for the most general scenario.
For any subnetwork H of G, and any i ∈ V (H), where V (H) is the node set of H , we use dwH(i) =∑
j∈V (H) wij to denote the weighted degree of i in H . For any real function f and any nonempty subset S
of its domain, let f(S) =
∑
s∈S f(s).
ALGORITHM 1: Iterative Pricing
Input: Network G = (V,E) with weight function w ∈ ZV×V+ and intrinsic value function ν ∈ R
V
+ .
Output: Sequence p of prices.
1. G0 ← G, t← 0
2. While V (Gt) 6= ∅ do
3. t← t+ 1
4. pt ← max{ν(i) + dwGt−1(i) : i ∈ V (Gt−1)}
5. Gt ← Gt−1 \B(pt)
6. End-while
7. Output p← (p1, p2, . . . , pt)
Theorem 3.8. For the PNC model, Algorithm 1 finds a 2-approximate pricing sequence in O(n2) time.
Proof. Let p∗ be an optimal pricing, and p = (p1, p2, . . . , pτ ) be the pricing output by the algorithm. Since
each link ij ∈ E can contribute at most 2wij to consumers’ total values (wij to each of i and j), we see that
r(p∗) ≤ ν(V ) + 2w(E).
On the other hand, the definition of pt in Step 4 of Algorithm 1 guarantees that B(pt) = argmax{ν(i) +
dwGt−1(i) : i ∈ V (Gt−1)} and therefore each link ij ∈ E(Gt−1) with i ∈ B(pt) contributes wij to i’s total
value, giving
pt · |B(pt)| = ν(B(pt)) +
∑
i∈B(pt)
dwGt−1(i) ≥ ν(B(pt)) + w(E(Gt−1)− E(Gt)), for all t ∈ [τ ].
It follows that
r(p) =
τ∑
t=1
pt · |B(pt)| ≥
τ∑
t=1
ν(B(pt)) +
τ∑
t=1
w(E(Gt−1)− E(Gt))
= ν(∪τt=1B(pt)) +
τ∑
t=1
w(E(Gt−1))− w(E(Gt))
= ν(V ) + w(E(G0))− w(E(Gτ ))
= ν(V ) + w(E),
where G0 = G and Gτ = ∅ are guaranteed by Steps 1 and 2. Hence
r(p∗)/r(p) ≤ (ν(V ) + 2w(E))/(ν(V ) + w(E)) ≤ 2
justifies the approximation ratio 2.
To see the O(n2) running time, we note that the while-loop repeats τ ≤ n times, and each repetition
finishes in O(n) time.
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3.3 Optimal pricing for unweighted split networks
Network G = (V,E) is a split network if its node set V can be partitioned into two sets C and I such
that C induces a clique and I is an independent set of G. Clearly, the nodes in I can only have neighbors
in C. In case of each node in I adjacent to exactly one node in C, network G is called core-peripheral.
Core-peripheral networks are widely accepted as good simplifications of many real-world networks and thus
have been extensively studied in various environments [8].
We consider the case of uniform intrinsic values, which can be assumed w.l.o.g. to be zeros. Let d(v) =
dG(v) denote the degree of v ∈ V in G. Suppose that C = {v1, v2, . . . , vk}, and d(vi) ≤ d(vi+1) for every
i ∈ [k − 1]. For each i ∈ [k], note that v1, . . . , vi form a clique set Ci and their neighbors in I form an
independent set Ii, and Ci ∪ Ii induces a split subnetwork Gi of G with degree sequence
dGi(u
i
ℓi) ≤ dGi(u
i
ℓi−1) ≤ · · · ≤ dGi(u
i
1) ≤ dGi(v1) ≤ · · · ≤ dGi(vi),
where Ii = {ui1, u
i
2, . . . , u
i
ℓi
}. Apparently, dGi(vh) = d(vh) − (k − i) for every h ∈ [i]. Consider an optimal
pricing p = (p1, . . . , pτ ) for the PNC problem on Gi, and write the corresponding maximum revenue as
opt(Gi). One of the following must hold.
• p1 = dGi(vh+1) for some h ∈ [i − 1], and exactly (i − h) nodes, i.e., vh+1, . . . , vi, purchase at price
p1, offering revenue (i − h)p1 = (i − h)dGi(vh+1). It follows that τ ≥ 2 and (p2, . . . , pτ ) is an optimal
pricing for Gh, giving opt(Gi) = (i− h)dGi(vh+1) + opt(Gh) = (i− h)d(vh+1 − k + i) + opt(Gh).
• p1 = dGi(u
i
j) for some j ∈ [ℓi] and exactly (i + j) nodes, i.e., u
i
j , u
i
j−1, . . . , u
i
1, v1, v2, . . . , vi, purchase
at price p1, offering revenue is (i + j)p1 = (i + j)dGi(u
i
j). Since the nodes not purchasing at price p1
are pairwise nonadjacent, it is easy to see that p = (p1) and opt(Gi) = (i+ j) · dGi(u
i
j).
For convenience, let opt(G0) stands for real number 0. Then opt(G) = opt(Gk) can be computed by the
following recursive formula:
opt(Gi) = max
ß
i−1
max
h=0
{opt(Gh) + (d(vh+1)− k + i)(i − h)},
ℓi
max
j=1
{(j + i) · dGi(u
i
j)}
™
for i = 1, 2, . . . , k.
This formula implies the following result.
Theorem 3.9. For the PNC model, an optimal pricing sequence for any unweighted split network with
uniform intrinsic values can be found in O(n2) time by dynamic programming.
4 Approximation by single pricing
Finding an optimal single pricing is trivial because it can be chosen from the n total values of the consumers.
Thus it is natural to ask: How does the optimal single pricing work as an approximation to the optimal
iterative pricing? We find that the answer is both “good” and “bad”, in the sense that single pricing works
rather well for many interesting networks with unit weights and uniform intrinsic values, including forests,
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks and Baraba´si-Albert networks, but in general, its worst-case performance, even when
restricted to unweighted networks, can be arbitrarily bad. This justifies the importance of the research of
iterative pricing, and at the same time poses the interesting question of investigating the relation between
single pricing and iterative pricing for more realistic scenarios.
In this section, we restrict our attention to unweighted networks G with uniform intrinsic values, for
which we may assume without loss of generality that all intrinsic values are zero, and use opt(G) to denote
the revenue derived from an optimal iterative pricing.
4.1 1.5-approximation for forests
We show that the best single price guarantees an approximate ratio of 1.5 for unweighted forests with uniform
intrinsic values.
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Theorem 4.1. For the PNC model, the single pricing p with maximum p · |B(p)| has an approximation ratio
of 1.5 for unweighted forests with uniform intrinsic values.
Proof. Suppose that forest G = G0 consists of k components (trees) Gh = (Vh, Eh), h = 1, . . . , k. Let ℓh
denote the number of leaves in Gh. Note that
∑k
i=1 opt(Gi) ≥ opt(G0), and
p · |B(p)| ≥ max{|B(1)|, 2|B(2)|} = max{|V0|, 2(|V0| − ℓ0)} ≥
2
3
(2|V0| − ℓ0) =
2
3
(
2
k∑
i=1
|Vi| −
k∑
i=1
ℓi
)
.
It suffices to show that opt(Gi) ≤ 2|Vi| − ℓi for each i ∈ [k], in order to guarantee that the approximation
is at most 1.5.
If Gi is a star network or a link, then opt(Gi) = |Vi| ≤ 2|Vi| − ℓi. Suppose that Gi is neither a star nor
a link, and let G′i be the tree obtained from Gi by deleting all its leaves. Clearly, dG′i(v) ≤ dGi(v) for every
non-leaf node of G′i.
Let p be an optimal pricing for Gi. Consider an arbitrary leaf u of G
′
i. Let L(u) denote the set of u’s leaf
neighbors in Gi. Under p, either u purchases before all nodes in L(u) at a price higher than 1 or all nodes
in {u} ∪ L{u} purchase at price 1. As u has at least one non-leaf neighbor in Gi, it is easy to see that in
either case, the total payment by nodes in {u}∪L(u) is upper bounded by dGi(u) ≤ dG′i(u) + |L(u)|. Hence
opt(Gi) ≤
∑
non-leaf node v of G′
i
dGi(v) +
∑
leaf node u of G′
i
(dG′
i
(u) + |L(u)|)
=
∑
non-leaf node v of G′
i
dG′
i
(v) +
∑
leaf node u of G′
i
(dG′
i
(u) + |L(u)|)
= ℓi +
∑
v∈Vi
dG′
i
(v)
= ℓi + 2(|Vi| − ℓi − 1)
< 2|Vi| − ℓi,
as desired.
Remark 4.2. In Theorem 4.1, to achieve the approximation ratio 1.5, the single price can be simply chosen
between 1 and 2, whichever produces a larger revenue. Moreover, the ratio 1.5 is tight, as shown by the
following tree G.
Tree G with n = 1 + 2k nodes is a spider with center of degree k and each leg of length 2 (i.e., the
tree obtain from star K1,k by subdividing each link with a node). It is easy to see that the maximum
revenue 3k is given by pricing sequence (k, 1). However, any single pricing can produce a revenue of at most
max{k · 1, 2 · (k + 1), 1 · (2k + 1)} = 2k + 2. The tightness follows from 3k/(2k+ 2)→ 1.5 (k →∞).
4.2 Near optimal pricing for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks
For large n, there is a simple algorithm that is “almost optimal” for “almost all” Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks
G(n, η(n)). The network is constructed by connecting n nodes randomly; each link is included in the
network with probability η(n). This algorithm, which will be referred to as A(δ), prices only once with price
(1− δ)(n− 1)η(n), where δ > 0 is a parameter to be determined by the approximation ratio that we intend
to reach.
Theorem 4.3. Given arbitrarily small positive number ǫ > 0, set δ ∈ (0, 1) such that
1 + δ
1− δ
< 1 + ǫ. (4.1)
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Then for the PNC model, Algorithm A(δ) has an approximation ratio of at most 1 + ǫ for asymptotically
almost all networks G(n, η(n)), as long as
η(n)√
(lnn)/n
→ +∞. (4.2)
To be precise, under condition (4.2), we have
lim
n→∞
Pr
Å
2|E(G(n, η(n)))|
r(G(n, η(n)))
≤ 1 + ǫ
ã
= 1, (4.3)
where E(G(n, η(n)) is the link set of G(n, η(n)), Pr(·) is the probability function, and r(G(n), η(n)) is the
revenue obtained from the single pricing (1− δ)(n− 1)η(n).
Proof. Let di be the degree of node i in the random network G(n, η(n)). As 0 < δ < 1, the following Chernoff
bound holds:
Pr(|di − (n− 1)η(n)| > δ(n− 1)η(n)) ≤ 2 exp
Å
−
δ2(η(n))2(n− 1)
2
ã
. (4.4)
Let αn be the number of nodes in G(n, η(n)) whose degrees fall into [(1−δ)(n−1)η(n), (1+δ)(n−1)η(n)].
That is, if we let Ii be an indicator random variable such that Ii = 1 if di ∈ [(1− δ)(n− 1)η(n), (1 + δ)(n−
1)η(n)] and Ii = 0 otherwise, then
αn =
n∑
i=1
Ii.
Now, we use αn to bound |E(G(n, η(n)))| and r(G(n, η(n))) as follows:
2|E(G(n, η(n)))| ≤ αn(1 + δ)(n− 1)η(n) + (n− αn)(n− 1),
r(G(n, η(n))) ≥ αn(1− δ)(n− 1)η(n).
Therefore,
2|E(G(n, η(n)))|
r(G(n, η(n)))
≤
αn(1 + δ)η(n) + (n− αn)
αn(1− δ)η(n)
,
P r
Å
2|E(G(n, η(n)))|
r(G(n, η(n)))
≤ 1 + ǫ
ã
≥ Pr
Å
αn(1 + δ)p+ (n− αn)
αn(1− δ)p
≤ 1 + ǫ
ã
= Pr (αn ≥ nǫ0) ,
where ǫ0 = 1/(ǫ(1− δ)η(n)− 2δη(n)+ 1), which is smaller than 1 due to (4.1). Using αn =
∑n
i=1 Ii, we have
Pr
Å
2|E(G(n, η(n)))|
r(G(n, η(n)))
≤ 1 + ǫ
ã
≥ Pr
(
n∑
i=1
(Ii − ǫ0) ≥ 0
)
= 1− Pr
(
n∑
i=1
(Ii − ǫ0) < 0
)
≥ 1− Pr (Ii − ǫ0 < 0 holds for at some i ∈ [n])
≥ 1−
n∑
i=1
Pr (Ii − ǫ0 < 0)
= 1−
n∑
i=1
Pr (Ii = 0)
= 1−
n∑
i=1
Pr (|di − (n− 1)η(n)| > δ(n− 1)η(n)) ,
12
where the second last equality is due to the fact that Ii ∈ {0, 1}. It follows from (4.4) and (4.2) that
Pr
Å
2|E(G(n, η(n)))|
r(G(n, η(n)))
≤ 1 + ǫ
ã
≥ 1−
n∑
i=1
2 exp
Å
−
δ2p2(n)(n− 1)
2
ã
→ 1 (n→∞).
This completes the proof.
4.3 (2− ǫ)-approximation for Baraba´si-Albert networks
The scale-free property (the power-law tail) has been nicely emulated by the multiple-destination preferential
attachment growth model introduced by Baraba´si and Albert [3]. Starting with a small number of nodes
(who are originally connected with each other), at each time step a new node enters network G = (V,E), and
attaches to β existing nodes. Each of the existing nodes is attached to the new one with a probability that is
proportional to its current degree. Such a process is well-known as the preferential attachment. Recall that
|V | = n. Let αn,k be the fraction of nodes with degree k. It is known from [7] that for any fixed ǫ > 0, and
any β ≤ k ≤ n1/15,
lim
n→∞
Pr
Å
(1− ǫ)
2β(β + 1)
k(k + 1)(k + 2)
≤ αn,k ≤ (1 + ǫ)
2β(β + 1)
k(k + 1)(k + 2)
ã
= 1. (4.5)
Note by the construction that each node has a degree of at least β. Let Γ be the set of all nodes that have
a degree of exactly β. Then
Γ is an independent set of G, (4.6)
because whenever two nodes are connected, the “older” one must have a degree at least β + 1. Note also
that for any fixed ǫ > 0, the inequality |E| ≤ (1 + ǫ/2)nβ holds for big enough n.
Theorem 4.4. Consider the PNC model. For any fixed ǫ > 0, with probability tending to one as n→∞, the
single pricing with price β achieves an approximation ratio of 2− 2/(2 + β) + ǫ for Baraba´si-Albert network
G. To be precise,
lim
n→∞
Pr
Å
opt(G)
nβ
≤ 2−
2
(2 + β)
+ ǫ
ã
= 1,
where nβ is the revenue obtained by single price β.
Proof. Given an optimal pricing sequence p for G = (V,E), we construct a charge c on E as follows: At
the time a node u ∈ V purchases with price p, it must have at least p neighbors, say v1, . . . , vp, who have
not purchased. We charge each link uvi (1 ≤ i ≤ p) with 1. After the charge operation is conducted for all
nodes, each link e ∈ E is charged at most twice (i.e. receives charge at most 2). Define c(e) = 0 if e is not
charged, c(e) = 1 if e is charged once, and c(e) = 2 if e is charged twice. Note that c(e) = 2 only if the both
ends of e purchase at the same time (under the same price). The charge function c : E → {0, 1, 2} satisfies
the property that c(E) =
∑
p∈p p|B(p)|. For i = 1, 2, let Ci consist of links e ∈ E with c(e) = i.
Recall the definition of Γ given above (4.6). We denote by δ(Γ) the set of links that are covered by Γ,
and S the set of nodes dominated by Γ. For each u ∈ S, let δ(u) denote the set of links covered by u. It is
straightforward that
δ(Γ) is the disjoint union of all Eu ≡ δ(u) ∩ δ(Γ), u ∈ S. (4.7)
We also know from (4.5) and (4.6) that
lim
n→∞
Pr
(
|δ(Γ)| =
∑
v∈Γ
d(v) ≥ (1 − ǫ/2)
2nβ
β + 2
)
= 1 (4.8)
For any node u ∈ S with nonempty Eu ∩ C2, considering any uv ∈ Eu ∩ C2, we see that u and v (∈ Γ)
purchase under the same price p ≤ d(v) = β. Since d(u) ≥ β + |Eu| ≥ p + |Eu ∩ C1| + |Eu ∩ C2| and
|δ(u) \ C2| ≥ d(u)− p, we have |δ(u) \ C2 \ (Eu ∩C1)| = |δ(u) \ C2| − |Eu ∩C1| ≥ |Eu ∩C2|. It follows that
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For each u ∈ S, there is a subset Fu of δ(u) \ C2 \ (Eu ∩ C1) with |Fu| = |Eu ∩C2| links.
As Fu is disjoint from both C2 and Eu∩C1, we have c(e) ≤ 1 for any e ∈ Fu, and c(e) = 0 for any e ∈ Fu∩Eu.
This enables us to modify c to be another charge function c′ : E → {0, 1, 2} such that c′(E) = c(E) and
c′(e) ≤ 1 for every e ∈ δ(Γ) as follows. For each u ∈ S, we increase the charge of each link in Fu by 1,
and decrease the charge of each link in Eu ∩C2 by 1. The resulting charge c′ is as desired because, as (4.7)
implies, δ(Γ) ∩ C2 is the disjoint union of Eu ∩ C2 for all u ∈ S. Therefore, we obtain
opt(G) =
∑
p∈p
p|B(p)| = c(E) = c′(E) ≤ 2|E| − |δ(Γ)|.
Using (4.8), we have with probability tending to 1 (as n→∞)
opt(G) ≤ 2(1 + ǫ/2)βn− (1 − ǫ/2)
2nβ
β + 2
≤
Å
2−
2
β + 2
+ ǫ
ã
nβ.
Observing finally that the single pricing with price β obtains revenue nβ completes the proof.
In the special case of β = 1, Baraba´si-Albert network G is a tree. The approximation ratio 2−2/(β+2) =
4/3 stands in contrast to the ratio 1.5 in Theorem 4.1 and Remark 4.2.
4.4 Upper and lower bounds for single pricing
Having seen the above constant approximations that single pricing achieves, one may ask: can best single
pricing always provide good approximations to optimal iterative pricing for unweighted networks with uni-
form intrinsic values? The following example shows that, in the worst case, the best single price can only
guarantee at most a fraction 1/(ln lnn) of the optimal revenue.
Example 4.5. The network G with n = k(k!)+1 nodes consists of
∑k
i=1 i = k(k+1)/2 node-disjoint cliques
and one special node which is adjacent to all other nodes, where the number of (k!/i)-cliques is i for each
1 ≤ i ≤ k.
In the above instance G, there are one node with degree k(k!), which is the special node, and k! nodes
with degree (k!)/i for i = 1, 2, . . . , k. Recall that r(p) denote the revenue under single pricing (p). Note that
r(k(k!)) = k(k!), and r((k!)/i) = (i(k!) + 1) · (k!)/i = (k!)2 + (k!)/i for i = 1, . . . , k. Then the best single
price is k!, which brings a revenue
r(k!) = (k!)2 + k! = max
p≥0
r(p).
On the other hand the pricing p = (p1, . . . , pk+1) with p1 = k(k!), pi+1 = (k!)/i, i = 1, . . . , k, brings revenue
r(p) = k(k!) +
∑k
i=1(k!)(k!/i − 1) = (k!)
2 ·
∑k
i=1(1/i). When k tends to infinity,
r(p)
r(k!)
=
∑k
i=1
1
i
1 + o(1)
≈ 1 + ln k = Θ(ln lnn).
In complementary to the above example, we show in the following theorem that, with single pricing, one
can always assure at least a factor 1/(1 + lnn) of the optimal revenue in unweighed network G with uniform
intrinsic values. Let d1, d2, . . . , dn with d1 ≥ d2 ≥ · · · ≥ dn be the degree sequence of G.
Theorem 4.6. opt(G)/maxni=1{idi} ≤ 1 + lnn.
Proof. Since
∑n
i=1 di ≥ opt(G), it suffices to show that
max
i=1,··· ,n
{idi} ≥
n∑
i=1
di
1 + lnn
.
14
Suppose on the contrary that idi <
∑
n
j=1
dj
1+lnn for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then we have
n∑
i=1
di <
(
n∑
i=1
1
i
)
·
∑n
i=1 di
1 + lnn
=⇒ 1 + lnn <
n∑
i=1
1
i
,
which is a contradiction.
5 Conclusion
Our work is an addition to the very limited literature on both pricing with negative network externalities
and iterative pricing. The model captures many interesting settings in real-world marketing, and is usually
much more challenging than the positive externality counterpart. The hardness result identifies complexity
status of a fundamental pricing problem. The algorithms achieve satisfactory performances in general and
several important special settings. An interesting direction for future research is to narrow the lower and
upper bounds on the approximability of the iterative pricing problem with negative externality. Obtaining
more accurate estimations for the optimal pricing is a key to reduce the approximation ratios.
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Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3.7
By reduction from the 3SAT problem, we prove that finding an optimal pricing sequence for the PNC model
is NP-hard, even when the underlying network is an unweighted tree without intrinsic values.
A Construction
Let I be an arbitrary instance of the 3SAT problem, whose input is given by n boolean variables x1, x2, · · · , xn,
and m clauses cj = (xj1 ∨ xj2 ∨ xj3), 1 ≤ j ≤ m, where xjℓ is a literal taken from {x1, x2, · · · , xn,¬x1,¬x2,
· · · ,¬xn}, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ 3. To avoid triviality, we assume that
m ≥ 5, and for each i ∈ [n], there exist j, j′ ∈ [m] such that xi ∈ c
j and ¬xi ∈ c
j′ . (A.1)
From the 3SAT instance I, we construct an instance of the PNC problem on tree G = (V,E) with unit
weight w|E = 1 and all intrinsic values zero as follows. Let R (resp. R¯) denote the set of ordered pairs (i, j)
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such that i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m] and xi ∈ cj (resp. ¬xi ∈ cj). Clearly, |R|+ |R¯| = 3m. Let k = k0, k1, k2, . . . , kn be
integers satisfying
ki ≥ ki−1 + 6m, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and k ≥ 6m. (A.2)
Tree G = (V,E) has |V | < 3m(k3n) +m(k
2 + k + 1) + (9mk3n) nodes in total, where V is the disjoint union
of the node sets of 3m variable gadgets, m clause gadgets and one connection gadget.
• For every (i, j) ∈ R, i.e., xi ∈ cj , there is a variable gadget X
j
i = (V
j
i , E
j
i ) which is a tree rooted at
node xji (see Figure 2(a)). Node set V
j
i with |V
j
i | = k
3
i − 2k
2
i +1 < k
3
n is the disjoint union of four sets
{xji}, V
j
i1, V
j
i2 and V
j
i3, where V
j
ih, h = 1, 2, 3, consists of nodes in X
j
i at distance h from x
j
i .
– Literal node xji , which simulates literal xi, has degree ki − 2 in X
j
i .
– V ji1 consists of the ki − 2 neighbors of x
j
i in X
j
i , all having degree ki.
– V ji2 consists of (ki − 2)(ki − 1) nodes, all having degree ki + 1.
– V ji3 consists of the (ki − 2)(ki − 1)ki leaves of X
j
i .
• For every (i, j) ∈ R¯, i.e., ¬xi ∈ cj , there is a variable gadget X¯
j
i = (V¯
j
i , E¯
j
i ) which is a tree rooted at
node x¯ji (see Figure 2(b)). Node set V¯
j
i with |V¯
j
i | = k
2
i < k
3
n is the disjoint union of three sets {x¯
j
i},
V¯ ji1 and V¯
j
i2, where V¯
j
ih, h = 1, 2, consists of nodes in X¯
j
i at distance h from x¯
j
i .
– Literal node x¯ji , which simulates literal ¬xi, has degree ki − 1 in X¯
j
i .
– V¯ ji1 consists of the ki − 1 neighbors of x¯
j
i in X¯
j
i , all having degree ki + 1.
– V¯ ji2 consists of the (ki − 1)ki leaves of X¯
j
i .
• For each clause cj , there is a clause gadget Cj = (V j , Ej) which is a tree rooted at node cj (see
Figure 2(c)). Node set V j with |V j | = k2+ k+1 is the disjoint union of three sets {cj}, V j1 and V j2,
where V jh, h = 1, 2, consists of nodes in Cj at distance h from cj .
– Clause node cj , which simulates the clause, has degree k in Cj .
– V j1 consists of the k neighbors of cj in Cj , all having degree k + 1.
– V j2 consists of the k2 leaves of Cj .
• For any literal xi and clause cj with xi ∈ cj , there is a link joining literal node x
j
i and clause node c
j .
For any literal ¬xi and clause cj with ¬xi ∈ cj , there is a link joining literal node x¯
j
i and clause node
cj.
• There is a connection gadget S = (VS , ES) which is a star centered at node s. The connection node s
has degree 9mk3n − 1 in S, and is adjacent to every clause node of G.
Obviously, the above construction of G = (V,E) can be done in polynomial time. It is easy to check that
G is a tree. In particular, all the 4m+1 node-disjoint gadgets (recall that |R|+ |R¯| = 3m) are connected by
4m links adjacent to clause nodes, where each clause node cj has exactly four neighbors outside Cj , three
being literal nodes and one being the connection node s. Let Ecl denote the set of 3m links connecting clause
nodes and literal nodes, and Ecs denote the set of m links connecting clause nodes and connection node s.
Then
V is the disjoint union of
⋃
(i,j)∈R
V ji ,
⋃
(i,j)∈R¯
V¯ ji ,
⋃
j∈[m]
V j and VS . (A.3)
E is the disjoint union of
⋃
(i,j)∈R
Eji ,
⋃
(i,j)∈R¯
E¯ji ,
⋃
j∈[m]
Ej , ES , Ecl, and Ecs. (A.4)
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Figure 2: Literal nodes and clause nodes are represented by circles, while auxiliary nodes are represented by
solid disks and (pendant) squares.
For any node v ∈ V , let d(v) denote the degree of v in G. The connection node s has degree
d(s) = |ES |+ |Ecs| = 9mk
3
n − 1 +m > 9mk
3
n. (A.5)
Note that each literal node has exactly one neighbor outside the variable gadget containing it, which is
a clause node. Therefore, for any (i, j) ∈ R, we have
d(xji ) = ki − 1, d(v) = ki for all v ∈ V
j
i1, and d(v) = ki + 1 for all v ∈ V
j
i2. (A.6)
For any (i, j) ∈ R¯, we have
d(x¯ji ) = ki, and d(v) = ki + 1 for all v ∈ V¯
j
i1. (A.7)
For every j ∈ [m], we have
d(cj) = k + 4, and d(v) = k + 1 for all v ∈ V j1. (A.8)
Other nodes, i.e., those not mentioned in (A.5) – (A.8), are exactly leaves of G. It is worthwhile noting
from (A.2) that all the non-leaf consumers in the variable gadgets have much larger degrees than the non-leaf
consumers in the clause gadgets. This permits us to consider the former consumers before the latter ones.
B Pricing
Given any integer pricing sequence p = (p1, p2, . . . , pτ ) for G, let ξ = min{t : pt ∈ p and pt ≤ k + 3} be
the first time that the price is equal to or lower than k + 3. Note that if p1 = d(s), then at time 1, only s
purchases, and before time ξ, no consumer in the clause gadgets has purchased, i.e.
Bξ−1(p) ∩ (∪
m
j=1V
j) = ∅. (B.1)
Claim 4. Let Dj = {xji : xi ∈ c
j , i ∈ [n]} ∪ {x¯ji : ¬xi ∈ c
j , i ∈ [n]}. If p1 = d(s), then the following holds for
each j ∈ [m].
(i) Either rCj (p) ≤ |E
j |+ 3, or |Ej |+ k + 1 ≤ rCj (p) ≤ |E
j |+ k + 3.
(ii) If rCj (p) ≥ |E
j |+ k + 1 then Dj \Bξ−1(p) 6= ∅ and p ∩ [k + 1, k + 3] 6= ∅.
(iii) If Dj \Bξ−1(p) 6= ∅ and p ∩ [k, k + 3] = {k + 1}, then rCj (p) = |E
j |+ k + 1.
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Proof. Recall that νt(v,p) denotes the (total) value of the product at time t for consumer v ∈ V . As
p1 = d(s) = ν1(s,p) > d(v) = ν1(v,p) for all v ∈ V \ {s}, only consumer s purchases at time 1. Then for
any t ∈ [2, τ ] it holds that νt(cj ,p) ≤ ν2(cj ,p) = k+3.Thus cj can only purchase at a price no greater than
k + 3.
In case of cj purchasing at some price in [k+2, k+3], either all consumers in V j1 purchase at some price
within [2, k], in which case rCj\{cj}(p) ≤ k
2 = |Ej | − k; or all consumers in Cj \ {cj} purchase at price 1, in
which case rCj\{cj}(p) = k+k
2 = |Ej | . So either rCj (p) ≤ |E
j |+3 or rCj (p) ∈ {|E
j|+k+2, |Ej |+k+3}.
In case of cj purchasing at price k + 1, all consumers in V j1 purchase at price k + 1, giving rCj (p) =
(k + 1)(1 + k) = k2 + 2k + 1 = |Ej |+ k + 1.
Consider now the case of cj not purchasing at any price above k. Note first it is possible that cj never
purchases at all under p, and that consumers in V j1 will never purchase at a price higher than k + 1. If
one and thus all consumers in V j1 purchase before cj , then rCj (p) is maximized when all consumers in V
j1
purchase at price k+1, saying rCj (p) ≤ (k+1)k+3 = |E
j |+3. If none of the consumers in V j1 purchases
before cj , then rCj (p) ≤ max{k(1 + k), 1 + k + k
2} = |Ej |+ 1.
Hence we see that (i) holds, and rCj (p) ≥ |E
j |+k+1 only if cj purchases under some price pt ∈ [k+1, k+3]
at time t. Recalling the time point ξ defined at the beginning of this section, we have t ≥ ξ, which implies
Dj \Bξ−1(p) 6= ∅. So (ii) is valid.
Suppose now that Dj \Bξ−1(p) 6= ∅. Recall from (B.1) that cj does not purchase before time ξ. It follows
that νξ(c
j ,p) ≥ k + 1. If p ∩ [k, k + 3] = {k + 1}, then pξ = k + 1. It follows that cj and all consumers in
V j1 purchase at price pξ = k + 1, yielding (iii).
Note from (A.6) and (A.7) that for any i ∈ [n], both max{d(v) : (i, j) ∈ R, v ∈ V ji } and max{d(v) :
(i, j) ∈ R¯, v ∈ V¯ ji } are upper bounded by ki + 1; thus none of consumers in ∪j:(i,j)∈RV
j
i and ∪j:(i,j)∈R¯V¯
j
i
purchases when the price is above ki + 1. Furthermore, the following two claims can be easily checked by
charging (a part of) revenue obtained at a vertex to a subset of edges incident with it, where each edge
receives a charge of 1.
Claim 5. For any (i, j) ∈ R, the following hold:
(i) if p ∩ [ki − 1, ki + 1] = {ki + 1, ki − 1}, then rξ−1,V j
i
(p) = |Eji |+ 1 and x
j
i ∈ Bξ−1(p);
(ii) if p ∩ [ki − 1, ki + 1] = {ki}, then rξ−1,V j
i
(p) = |Eji | and x
j
i 6∈ Bξ−1(p).
(iii) if p ∩ [ki − 1, ki + 1] ∈ {{ki + 1, ki − 1}, {ki}}, then rV j
i
(p) ≤ |Eji |+ 1.
Proof. To see (i), we consider the time, say t, when price pt = ki + 1 is announced, all consumers in V
j
i2
purchase, and others in V ji \ V
j
i2 do not. We charge the revenue ki + 1 obtained at each consumer of V
j
i2 to
the ki+1 edges incident with it. Next, at time t+1, price pt+1 = ki−1 is announced, and only x
j
i purchases,
because the product value is ki − 1 for x
j
i , and 1 (resp. 0) for each consumer in V
j
i1 (resp. V
j
i3) at that time.
Now we charge the ki−2 edges in E
j that are incident with xji . So all edges in E
j
i are charged and 1 revenue
is left (this amount corresponds to the edge that connects xi and the clause gadget C
j), which gives (i), as
after xji ’s purchase the product values 0 for all consumers in V
j
i1 ∪ V
j
i3.
To see (ii), note first that only consumers in V ji1∪V
j
i2 purchase under price ki. For each v ∈ V
j
i1, we charge
the ki edges incident with v; for each v ∈ V
j
i2, we charge the ki pendant edges incident with v. All edges of
Eji have been charged and no revenue is left. Now, the product values 1 for x
j
i and 0 for all consumers in
V ji3. Hence (ii) holds.
Statement (iii) is straightforward from the proofs of (i) and (ii).
Claim 6. For any (i, j) ∈ R¯, the following hold:
(i) if p ∩ [ki − 1, ki + 1] = {ki + 1, ki − 1}, then rξ−1,V¯ j
i
(p) = |E¯ji | and x¯
j
i 6∈ Bξ−1(p);
(ii) if p ∩ [ki − 1, ki + 1] = {ki}, then rξ−1,V¯ j
i
(p) = |E¯ji |+ 1 and x¯
j
i ∈ Bξ−1(p).
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(iii) if p ∩ [ki − 1, ki + 1] ∈ {{ki + 1, ki − 1}, {ki}}, then rV¯ j
i
(p) ≤ |E¯ji |+ 1.
Proof. In proving (i), for each consumer in V¯ ji1, we charge the ki + 1 edges incident with it. In proving (ii),
for each consumer in V¯ ji1, we charge the ki pendant edges incident with it; for x¯
j
i , we charge the ki − 1 edges
in E¯ji that are incident with it. Statement (iii) is then instant.
In the rest of this section we discuss the properties of normal pricing sequences.
Claim 7. For any i ∈ [n], if p is normal and p ∩ [ki − 1, ki + 1] /∈ {{ki + 1, ki − 1}, {ki}}, then one of the
following holds:
(i) p ∩ [ki, ki + 1] = ∅, in which case rV j
i
(p) < |Eji | − 12m+ 1 for every every j ∈ [m] with (i, j) ∈ R, and
rV¯ j
i
(p) < |E¯ji | − 12m+ 1 for every every j ∈ [m] with (i, j) ∈ R¯.
(ii) p ∩ [ki − 1, ki + 1] = {ki + 1} and p ∩ [2, ki − 2] 6= ∅, in which case rV j
i
(p) ≤ |Eji | − 6m+ 5 for every
j ∈ [m] with (i, j) ∈ R, and rV¯ j
i
(p) ≤ |E¯ji | for every j ∈ [m] with (i, j) ∈ R¯.
(iii) p∩ [ki − 1, ki + 1] = {ki +1} and p∩ [1, ki − 2] ⊆ {1}, in which case rV j
i
(p) ≤ |Eji |+1 for every every
j ∈ [m] with (i, j) ∈ R, and rV¯ j
i
(p) ≤ |E¯ji |+ 1 for every j ∈ [m] with (i, j) ∈ R¯.
Proof. If p ∩ [ki, ki + 1] = ∅, then no consumer in (∪j:(i,j)∈RV
j
i ) ∪ (∪j:(i,j)∈R¯V¯
j
i ) purchases at a price higher
than ki − 1. It follows that rV j
i
(p) ≤ (ki − 1)|V
j
i2 ∪ V
j
i1 ∪ {x
j
i}|=1+ |E
j
i | − |V
j
i2| = |E
j
i | − (ki − 2)(ki − 1) + 1
for every j ∈ [m] with (i, j) ∈ R and rV¯ j
i
(p) ≤ (ki − 1)|V¯
j
i1 ∪ {x¯
j
i}| = |E¯
j
i | − |V¯
j
i1| = |E¯
j
i | − (ki − 1) for every
j ∈ [m] with (i, j) ∈ R¯. Now (ki − 2)(ki − 1)− 1 > ki − 1 ≥ 12m− 1, which is implied by (A.2), gives (i).
It remains to consider the case where there exist pt (1 ≤ t ≤ τ) that is the maximum price in p ∩
[ki, ki + 1] 6= ∅. If pt = ki, then the maximality of pt together with (A.2) and (A.6) – (A.8) implies that
all consumers in V ji1 ∪ V
j
i2 with (i, j) ∈ R and those in {x¯
j
i} ∪ V¯
j
i1 with (i, j) ∈ R¯ would purchase under
price ki at time t. Note from (A.5) that consumer s must have purchased by time t. After time t any
consumer without the product has value at most ki−1 + 3 < ki − 1 (recall (A.6) – (A.8) and (A.2)). It
follows from normality of p that ki − 1 6∈ p, enforcing p ∩ [ki − 1, ki + 1] = {ki}, a contradiction to the
condition p ∩ [ki − 1, ki + 1] /∈ {{ki + 1, ki − 1}, {ki}} of the claim. Thus pt = ki + 1, and all consumers in
V ji2 with (i, j) ∈ R and those in V¯
j
i1 with (i, j) ∈ R¯ purchase under price ki + 1 at time t, bringing about
revenues |Eji |−(ki−2) and |E¯
j
i |, respectively. Notice again that s has purchased by time t. After time t, any
consumer without the product has value at most ki − 1, which along with the normality of p gives ki 6∈ p.
In turn p ∩ [ki − 1, ki + 1] 6= {ki + 1, ki − 1} implies p ∩ [ki − 1, ki + 1] = {ki + 1}.
As ki − 1 6∈ p, the normality of p enforces p ∩ [ki−1 + 4, ki − 1] = ∅. It follows from (A.2) that
rV j
i
(p) ≤ |Eji | − (ki − 2) + (ki−1 + 3) ≤ |E
j
i | − 6m+ 5.
In case of p ∩ [2, ki − 2] 6= ∅, before variable nodes x¯
j
i with (i, j) ∈ R¯ purchase (possibly) at price 1 or 0,
all clause nodes have purchased under some price in p∩ [2, ki− 2]. It follows that all these x¯
j
i with (i, j) ∈ R¯
can only purchase at price 0, yielding (ii).
In case of p ∩ [2, ki − 2] = ∅, we have p ∩ [1, ki − 2] ⊆ {1}, implying rV¯ j
i
(p) ≤ |E¯ji |+ 1 and hence (iii).
Due to the above analysis, it can also be observed that the three situations stated in this claim are all
the possible ones.
Combining Claims 5(iii), 6(iii) and 7 we obtain the following corollary.
Claim 8. If p is normal, then rV j
i
(p) ≤ |Eji |+ 1 for all (i, j) ∈ R and rV¯ j
i
(p) ≤ |E¯ji |+ 1 for all (i, j) ∈ R¯.
Claim 9. If p is normal and r(p) > |V |, then p1 = d(s).
20
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that p1 6= d(s). By normality of p, we have p1 < d(s), and furthermore
p1 ≤ kn + 1 (recalling (A.2) and (A.5)–(A.8)). It follows that either p1 = 1, giving r(p) = |V |, or p1 ≥ 2,
giving
r(p) = r{s}(p) + rV \{s}(p) ≤ (kn + 1) + 2(|E| − |ES |) = (kn + 1) + 2(|V |−1−|ES|) < 9mk
3
n < d(s) < |V |,
where the third last inequality uses the fact that |V | < 3m(k3n) + m(k
2 + k + 1) + (9mk3n) and |ES | =
9mk3n − 1.
C Final proof
Having finished all necessary preparations, we are ready to establish the close relation between 3SAT instance
I and the PNC instance on tree G.
Theorem 3.7. (Restated) In the PNC model, computing the optimal pricing sequence is NP-hard, even
when the underlying network is an unweighted tree and all the intrinsic values are zero.
Proof. Let opt(G) denote the optimal objective value of the PNC instance on tree G = (V,E). Define
L = |E|+ (k − 2)m
To establish the NP-hardness of the pricing problem, it suffices to prove that opt(G) ≥ L if and only if the
3SAT instance I is satisfiable.
The “if” part. Suppose that I has a satisfactory truth assignment π with λ variables assigned “TRUE”
and the remaining n− λ variables assigned “FALSE”. Let p = (p1, p2, . . . , p2n−λ+1, p2n−λ+2) be a solution
to the PNC instance on G such that
• p1 = d(s);
• There are one or two prices for each variable gadget depending on whether the variable is assigned
“TRUE” or “FALSE” in π: if xi is assigned “TRUE” then ki ∈ p, if xi is assigned “FALSE”, then
{ki + 1, ki − 1} ⊂ p;
• There is a common price for the m clause gadgets: p2n−λ+2 = k + 1 ∈ p.
According to Claims 5 and 6, we have∑
(i,j)∈R
rV j
i
(p) +
∑
(i,j)∈R¯
rV¯ j
i
(p) ≥
∑
(i,j)∈R
|Eji |+
∑
(i,j)∈R¯
|E¯ji |.
Furthermore, the satisfiability implies that Dj \Bξ−1(p) 6= ∅. Therefore, the condition in Claim 4(iii) holds
for every j ∈ [m], giving rCj (p) = |E
j | + k + 1 for every j ∈ [m]. It follows from (A.3) that the pricing
sequence p assures a revenue
r(p) = rVS (p) +
∑
(i,j)∈R
rV j
i
(p) +
∑
(i,j)∈R¯
rV¯ j
i
(p) +
∑
j∈[m]
rCj (p)
≥ d(s) +
∑
(i,j)∈R
|Eji |+
∑
(i,j)∈R¯
|E¯ji |+
∑
j∈[m]
(|Ej |+ 1 + k)
= |ES |+ |Ecs|+
∑
(i,j)∈R
|Eji |+
∑
(i,j)∈R¯
|E¯ji |+
∑
j∈[m]
(|Ej |+ 1 + k)
Now from (A.4) we derive r(p) ≥ |E| − |Ecl|+m(1 + k) = |E| − 3m+m(k + 1) = L, proving the “if” part.
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The “only if” part. Suppose now opt(G) ≥ L. Due to Observation 3.5, there exists a normal pricing
sequence p = (p1, p2, . . . , pτ ) whose objective value r(p) is at least L. As k ≥ 5m, which implies L >
|E|+1 = |V |, we derive from Claim 9 that p1 = d(s), which validates the subsequent application of Claim 4.
If rCj0 (p) < |E
j0 |+ k+1 for some j0 ∈ [m], it can be deduced from Claim 4(i) that rCj0 (p) ≤ |E
j0 |+3.
Recalling (A.3), we derive from Claims 8 and 4(i) that
r(p) = rVS (p) +
∑
(i,j)∈R
rV j
i
(p) +
∑
(i,j)∈R¯
rV¯ j
i
(p) +
∑
j∈[m]
rCj (p)
≤ |ES |+ |Ecs|+
∑
(i,j)∈R
(|Eji |+ 1) +
∑
(i,j)∈R¯
(|E¯ji |+ 1) +
∑
j∈[m]\{j0}
(|Ej |+ k + 3) + |Ej0 |+ 3.
Recalling (A.4), we have
r(p) ≤ |E| − |Ecl|+ (|R|+ |R¯|) + (m− 1)(k + 3) + 3
= |E| − 3m+ 3m+ (k − 2)m+ 5m− k
= L− (5m− k).
Then k > 5m implies r(p) < L, a contradiction. Thus for every j ∈ [m] we have rCj (p) ≥ |E
j | + k + 1,
which along with Claim 4(ii) implies Dj \Bξ−1(p) 6= ∅ and p ∩ [k + 1, k + 3] 6= ∅.
Suppose that there exists i0 ∈ [n] such that p∩ [ki0 − 1, ki0 +1] /∈ {{ki0 +1, ki0 − 1}, {ki0}}. Recall from
(A.1) that there exists j0 ∈ [m] such that (i0, j0) ∈ R. Notice from p∩[k+1, k+3] 6= ∅ that p∩[2, ki0−2] 6= ∅,
because [k + 1, k + 3] ⊆ [2, ki0 − 2] as guaranteed by (A.2). If p ∩ [ki0 − 1, ki0 + 1] = {ki0 + 1}, then Claim
7(ii) implies that r
V
j0
i0
(p) ≤ |Ej0i0 | − 6m+ 5 and further that
r(p) = rVS (p) +
∑
(i,j)∈R
rV j
i
(p) +
∑
(i,j)∈R¯
rV¯ j
i
(p) +
∑
j∈[m]
rCj(p)
≤ |ES |+ |Ecs|+
∑
(i,j)∈R\{(i0,j0)}
(|Eji |+ 1) + (|E
j0
i0
| − 6m+ 5) +
∑
(i,j)∈R¯
(|E¯ji |+ 1) +
∑
j∈[m]
(|Ej |+ k + 3)
= |E| − |Ecl|+ (|R|+ |R¯| − 1)− 6m+ 5 +m(k + 3)
= |E| − 3m+ (3m− 1) +m(k − 2) + 5−m
= L+ 4−m.
Then m ≥ 5 implies a contradiction to r(p) ≥ L, which reduces us to the case p ∩ [ki0 , ki0 + 1] = ∅
and r
V
j0
i0
(p) < |Ej0i0 | − 12m + 1 as stated in Claim 7(i). Since |E
j0
i0
| − 12m + 1 is obviously smaller than
|Ej0i0 |−6m+5, we still have r(p) < L. The contradiction shows that no such an i0 ∈ [n] exists, and therefore
the conditions in Claims 5 and 6 hold. This enables us to construct a truth assignment π as follows: for
each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, if p ∩ [ki − 1, ki + 1] = {ki + 1, ki − 1}, we assign “FALSE” to variable xi. Otherwise, that
is p ∩ [ki − 1, ki + 1] = {ki}, we assign xi “TRUE”. As argued above, Dj \ Bξ−1(p) 6= ∅ for all j ∈ [m].
Therefore π is indeed a satisfactory truth assignment for I. This completes the “only if” part and the whole
proof of Theorem 3.7.
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